Once considered extremist marginal groups, the Islamic movements moved to the center of Turkish politics. If someone told my republican parents two decades ago, that in 2007 our industrial home-city, Denizli, would be in the American newspaper New York Times, they could never guess that it would be about Islamist power rising in the city[i]. The same year, in the parliamentary elections, 43% of voters in
In order to fully understand the Islamic movements in
Another important Islamic social movement in
The most influential of Nursi’s followers has been Fethullah Gulen who created a global Islamic network. He was born in
Here the claim that the Turkish Islamist movements are modern requires a definition of modernity. This claim certainly doesn’t go hand in hand with the modernization theory’s definition of modernity that claims that choice is either
Turkish Islamic Movements have adapted themselves to modern world by positioning themselves as actors inside the Turkish nation-state, which they support overtly. Gulen movement’s support for the nation state has been a clear one: “he gives priority to community and the state over the individual.” (Yavuz, Esposito 2003: 29) Gulen thinks although the Kemalist state oppresses the Islamists, a state has to be supported since it is better than anarchy. Naksibendi movement also endorsed the nation-state building, even earlier as the nation building efforts were being made in the
In order to ally themselves with the secular nation state, the Islamic movements secularized their inner structures. Initially, National Outlook Movement of Erbakan adopted “state centered massive growth and social transformation” (Tepe 2008: 183) notion of the secular state. The movement transferred experts in, who hadn’t had any Islamic training under the movement or under its Iskenderpasa Sufi Order, in order to structure its secular, mundane goals. After gaining public support, those experts like Abdullah Gul later caused the separation of Justice and Development Party from National Outlook movement. Party leaderships of both movements constituted of highly educated people, dominantly engineers and lawyers in the NO movement while dominantly business, finance and communication oriented experts in JDP (Tepe 2008: 201,221). JDP also was the first party to assign referees to monitor internal democracy of the party. Gulen Movement applied secular strategies in their education networks; all classes are secular and religious ideas are transmitted only by example setting behavior and communal extracurricular activities. In a system which depends on rational thought, secular inner structure was understood to be the key to success for even the religious movements.
As a part of their secular and modern strategies, Turkish Islamic Movements created text based “Imagined Communities”[iv]. Nurcu movement created its network of “textual communities known as dershanes” (Yavuz, Esposito 2003: 8) in which reading and discussing works of Said Nursi created the imagined community of his followers. Even after his death mutual reading of his work created the ties which bind the Nurcus from every
The horizontal relations between the movement and the followers resulted in objectification of religion in those imagined communities. In Nurcu circles, dershanes are the settings in which religion is discussed on a very personal level rather than a dogmatic level: “In the deshanes, people are asked to see Nursi as their dost (friend) with whom they converse on intimate terms” (Yavuz, Esposito 2003: 15). Under these conditions there is no intermediary or vertical obstacle between the founder and follower. Thereby, the follower is able to personalize his understanding of religion. Like Nursi, Gulen sees dogmas as obstacles that need to be overcome. He sees the objectification of religion as the panacea to Islamist extremism: “The fiction that door of consultation has been closed has put Islam in the hands of bigots” (Cited by Sevindi 2008, 69). Both Nursi and Gulen encourage their followers to analyze the religion rationally to create a modern personal understanding.
One of the reasons, the Islamic movement rose as a modern movement was the fact that it was born as an urban movement, rather than a rural one. As Yavuz reports, before 1960s, Turkish elite was dominated by the urban population and Ottoman Muslim emigrates from Balkans and
Not only successful modern movements of 20th century, the Islamic movements were also very easily adaptable to global and liberal world order after the cold war’s end. Because the movement’s resources came from Anatolian Tigers, globalization and free trade contributed to Islamic movements’ success via the Tigers’ export revenues. The Islamic movements easily connected the financial successes to their own causes: “They view prosperity as demonstrating God’s grace to his believers.” (Yavuz 2003: 30) Naksibendi Movement’s latest head Cosan even related Adam Smith’s “the invisible hand” to divine wisdom (Yavuz 2003: 142). With the rise of Anatolian Tigers, aforementioned struggle between established elite and new conservative bourgeoisie defined the Secularist-Islamist tension. However, both the established elite and the Tigers requested liberal economic policies and good relations with the EU and the IMF, and Erdogan allied himself with both sides of “the money”, new and old, by promoting those. The secularist politicians kept their old assumption that this struggle was between “have’s and have not’s”, between moderns and reactionaries, and could not benefit from the changes in the last decade.
Not only the economic liberalization but also the political liberalization was a force behind the Islamic movements. Clearly under a regime that is defined by laicizing the state and its population, Islamic movements preferred more freedom. As early as the first decades of the republic, Nursi asked for a state that does not have any constitutional ideology (Yavuz, Esposito 2003: 11). Islamic call for freedom was based on the fact that the smaller Kemalist state meant larger opportunity spaces for Islamic establishments. The Kemalist state-led institutions never favored agents with Islamic tendencies. Not being able to inject themselves into the state, Islamist movements got stronger as the state got smaller. As political reforms reduced sanctions on private ownership of education and press, Islamic capital created its own means of communication. This communication was further supported by the increased freedom of expression that has been brought about by the EU adaptation reforms. Now without the state’s direct censorship the Islamist counterargument could be transmitted to the masses.
In accord with Islamist support for larger freedom, the Islamist movements largely supported individual development and consciousness, two essential aspects of globalized world’s people. Gulen may be the Islamic leader who most openly encourages his followers to be active citizens. He sees being able to reason as the foremost requirement of Islam, and defines Muslims as proactive viceroys of God on earth (article by Kuru. Yavuz, Esposito 2003: 124-129). Rather than obedient citizens of a state-led movement, Gulen wants his followers to claim right to be able to change their environments. JDP also pronounces the difference from the preceding political parties of National Outlook Movement, in that JDP aims at a progress that will be brought about by individual endeavors. “Individuals have the capacity to mold this change” (Tepe 2008: 210) is the way JDP defines the change that will come as it leads the country. Nevertheless, defining Islamic movements as true liberal movements would be a mistake because just like Republicans, they have normative goals. They define the problem in the nation in their own ways and believe there is a certain remedy, which involves religion. For instance, their stance against Alevi sect of Islam is marginalizing this sect, although JDP’s rhetoric ostensibly supports the religious freedom. Although they can’t be called liberal, for their purposes the Islamic Movements support individual’s free will development as a general concept.
Commoditization of Islamic symbols also shows the ability of Islamic movements to utilize privatized system for their own benefit. As the Islamic market in
The Republicans were right with their claims that the backward movements can not win against them. Islamist movements gained power against them because the movements were progressive and modern. The movements recognized and supported the nation state as a guarantee of the Muslim community’s security. They promoted Turkishness as well as Muslimness. With their secularized structures they gained legitimacy and fought a power struggle with rational methods. They opened the field of religion as well as field of politics to discussion in order to benefit from changes, and to be able to adapt easily. The movement’s followers were mostly educated and urban, not lacking modern skills of their republican counterparts. The followers easily succeeded in creating business networks that counterbalanced the elitist state-led business networks. On their way to adaptation and success in an age of globalization they did not have extremist conservative stances against using religious identity for economic or political purposes. The Islamic movement in
Bibliography:
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· Yavuz, M. Hakan and Esposito, John L. Turkish Islam and the
· Navaro-Yashin, Yael. Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in
· Tepe, Sultan. Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in
· Houston, Cristopher. Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State. Berg, 2001.
· Jung, Dietrich and Piccoli, Wolfgango.
· Gelvin, James. The Modern
· Özyürek, Esra. Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in
· Sevindi, Nevval. Contemporary Islamic Conversations: M. Fethullah Gülen on
· Cinar, Alev. Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in
[i] Tavernisa, Sabrina. “A Secular Turkish City Feels Islam’s Pulse Beating Stronger, Causing Divisions”. New York Times, 06.01.2007.
[ii] The Economist Print Edition. “Global Muslim networks, How far they have travelled”. 03.06.2008
[iii] Medyatava website. “Newspaper Net Sales Between 12.01.2008-12.07.2008”. http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj.asp
[iv] Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. Verso, 1991.
[v] Navaro-Yashin, Yael. Faces of the State, 94.

